Bonus: Interview with Prof. Alexander Mikaberidze (2 of 3) The Third Coalition

For those picking up War & Peace, deciphering the context of this era is a challenge. This episode is a great resource regarding the initial stages of the War of the Third Coalition in 1805.  

France prevailed over the 1st Coalition in 1797 and 2nd Coalition in 1801. Afterward, France controlled much of Western Europe, including (from today’s perspective): Belgium, much of Southern Germany, Switzerland, and various parts of Italy. Spain was also a junior partner of France. 

Napoleon was having success pushing for a reorganization of the German states, which included the Imperial Recess of 1803. This movement threatened the centuries-old interests of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.  

The War of the Third Coalition began in the Summer of 1805. The Coalition had manpower of over a half a million, but they were spread out and not organized. For example, the Coalition had a presence in the Netherlands, Hanover (Northern Germany), Southern Italy, and Prussia. The Coalition was eager to invade Bavaria, a French ally. The Austrians wanted to pressure (through force) the Bavarians to align with them. The feeling was: what Bavaria does, so will most of the German states.

Gen. Kutuzov led the largest contingent of the Czar’s forces and was given the task of uniting with Austrians as they pushed into Bavaria. Kutuzov initially had to cover about 900 miles to link up. He started out with around 50,000, but by the time he arrived, only half his troops remained. 

In September, Austrian forces made the move into Bavaria. Kutuzov’s forces were expected in early October, but were late. The march was slower than expected, leaving a wide gap between Austrians and Russian forces.  When Kutuzov arrived, his men were exhausted and ill-equipped. Nevertheless, the Austrians wanted to get their allies right into the fight, especially at Ulm. Kutuzov recognized this would be fruitless and held back.

Napoleon grasped the situation and attacked relatively isolated Austrians, demolishing them at Ulm. He then turned his attention to chasing Kutuzov before reinforcements could arrive. Kutuzov recognizes retreat is the best option -- to thin out Napoleon’s forces. Kutuzov engages the French with his rear guard, often led by Gen. Peter Bagration.   By November, Napoleon is weaker, but still threatening.  Kutuzov was waiting for Winter and for Coalition forces to be reinforced. Prof. Mikaberidze contends that if Kutuzov’s advice was followed, Napoleon likely would have lost the war in the first half of 1806.

We then move onto a discussion of the daily experience of officers and soldiers, based on correspondence the Professor reviewed.  From the French perspective, there is a realization Napoleon is winning through speed. The French are stressed but were moved by a sense of elation. They feel part of something monumental. Russian officers communicated a life of drudgery. Many were sick or lagging behind and walked with boots that were in tatters. There was an utter lack of food and supplies. This was a responsibility the Austrians were not living up to.   Nevertheless, there was a sense of pride and group cohesion on both sides. 

Overall, Kutuzov held a reputation for treating his men decently. He made a point to visit soldiers during common gatherings such as around camp fires. He asked about their experience. He would occasionally sit down with rank-and-file soldiers over a bowl of porridge. 

The Professor also discusses hierarchical nature of Russian society and the Table of Ranks (there were 14 total) imposed by Peter the Great. It was adopted from European systems and held up until 1917.   One would start at bottom, and ideally (though not in practice) advance through merit and perseverance.